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Abstract 
Trust decisions made in the social world have important consequences for decision makers, 
such as financial and/or social losses. Given the importance of these decisions, psychologists 
often ask what variables lead to trust. The most commonly studied predictor variable is the 
degree of similarity between participants and their interaction partners. Here we ask how a 
more visible cue, social reciprocity, affects trust decisions in concert with similarity. We use 
a “chat-room” style task to independently manipulate the degree to which participants are 
similar to a set of avatars that they believe are other players and the degree to which those 
avatars display social reciprocity. We then assess trust decisions in both financial and social 
domains. Our results show that together with similarity, social reciprocity is an important 
independent predictor of trust decisions. This work has implications for understanding how 
and when trust is allocated, as well how to facilitate successful interactions.  
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Decisions about whether to trust another person, and their subsequent effects on 
behaviour are critical elements of the social environment. At the core of these decisions 
are the factors upon which people base interpersonal judgments. As with decisions in the 
cognitive domain, people rely on heuristics to make social decisions quickly, efficiently, 
and often, with little information about the true trustworthiness of their social partners 
(Metzger & Flanagin, 2013). For example, people may use the degree to which they 
perceive themselves to be similar to an interaction partner when making trust-based 
decisions. Because humans naturally attend to this type of social information (Wood, 
1996), it likely guides the application of heuristics in the social decision-making process. 
The most frequently studied behavioural predictor of interpersonal decisions is the 
degree to which two people are similar to one another. Researchers have examined 
similarity across a variety of contexts and choice types, such as negotiation outcomes 
(Wilson, DeRue, Matta, Howe, & Conlon, 2016) and romantic partner selection 
(Campbell, Chin, & Stanton, 2016; Tidwell, Eastwick, & Finkel, 2013). Findings from 
this work broadly suggest that as the similarity between oneself and one’s interaction 
partners increases, one is more likely to like, cooperate with, and trust those partners 
(Fischer, 2009; Lui, Ngo, & Hon, 2006). Thus, high levels of similarity positively 
influence interpersonal perception (Bagues & Perez-Villadoniga, 2013) 
Researchers often operationalize and manipulate interpersonal similarity using 
group membership (e.g., Chen & Kenrick, 2002; Vang & Fox, 2013). Specifically, people 
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who are similar to the self on some experimentally salient dimension (e.g., race, sex, 
location of origin, team assignment, university) are classified as in-group members and 
those who are dissimilar on that dimension become the out-group (e.g., Appiah, 
Knobloch-Westerwick, & Alter, 2013). Evidence from this work largely shows that 
people are much more likely to like, cooperate with and trust in-group relative to out-
group members, partially because they are more similar with respect to the experimental 
context (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014) 
One common operationalization of trust decisions in group-dynamics research is 
the degree to which participants are willing to cooperate (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 
1995). This is an obvious dependent variable because of the natural relationship between 
cooperation and trust; to cooperate with another person, one must place trust in that 
person. This means work that investigates the effects of similarity on cooperation can 
also inform how similarity impacts trust. 
In experimental contexts, similarity generally promotes cooperative behaviours. 
For example, in an economic trust game, people who interact with a person of another 
race return less money than people who interact with a person of the same race (Glaeser, 
Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). Thus, physical or appearance-related similarity 
increases trust behaviours (e.g., DeBruine, 2002; DeBruine, 2005). Research has also 
indicated that people with similar interests are more likely to trust one another. For 
instance, Ziegler and Golbeck (2007) have reported that people who have similar tastes in 
film and literature trust one another more than people with dissimilar film/literature taste. 
In real-world business contexts, similarities between firms lead to increased trust, which 
results in decreased use of coercive strategies (Lui, Ngo, & Hon, 2006). These findings, 
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amongst others, suggest that similarity leads to incremental increases in trust and trust-
related behaviours. 
There are several mechanisms that may underpin the similarity-trust relationship. 
One such mechanism is evolutionary. Grounded in “kin selection” hypotheses, this idea 
suggests that because people frequently cooperate with and trust close relatives, who 
resemble themselves in appearance, people may use appearance as a signal to indicate 
trustworthiness (Farmer, McKay, & Tsakiris, 2013; Krupp, DeBruine, & Barclay, 2008). 
Findings suggest that people compute a “kinship index”, which indicates potential 
relatedness and consequently trustworthiness (Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2007). 
When the level of kinship, or the level of similarity in appearance increases, so does 
cooperative behaviour (Griffin & West, 2003). This means that increases in appearance 
similarity serve as a proxy for relatedness, thereby facilitating cooperation, altruistic 
behaviour, and trust (DeBruine, 2002; Krupp, DeBruine, & Barclay, 2007). 
Another mechanism that may underpin the similarity-trust association comes from 
the literature on relationship formation. Specifically, people who share interests, attitudes, 
and personality features are more likely to like each other than people who do not share 
these attributes (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Rushton & Bons, 2005; 
Youyou, Stillwell, Schwartz, & Kosinski, 2017). Thus, similarity may provide a footing 
upon which people can form close bonds, such as friendships and marriages. It is not 
surprising then that people trust those who are more similar to themselves on such 
dimensions than less similar individuals (Simons, 2008). Likewise, attitude similarity 
may be a heuristic cue for kinship (Park & Schaller, 2005), which further supports the 
idea that attitude similarity leads to trust. 
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A third explanation for the similarity-trust relationship comes from the literature 
on “fluency effects” (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmier, 2011; Whittlesea & LeBoe, 2000). 
The presence of similarity may make it easier to trust someone because similar attitudes 
and beliefs are more easily accessible. For example, people use their own attitudes and 
behaviours to interpret the attitudes and behaviours of those around them (Gordon, 1992), 
leading to easier recall of thoughts and attitudes, more accurate predictions of future 
behaviour, and increased positivity toward similar others. A recent functional imaging 
study supports this idea showing that people use the self as a reference when inferring 
others’ states and traits (Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008). The authors concluded that 
people tend to attribute their perceptions of others’ trustworthiness to shared similarity 
(Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008), likely enhancing perceived trust in the process 
(Krueger, 1998; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Thus, the ease or fluency with which people 
interpret others’ behaviour may be a heuristic that people use when making trust 
decisions. 
Interestingly, similarity need not be objectively present in order to achieve these 
effects. Rather, the mere perception of similarity is enough to convey benefits. For 
example, a naturalistic longitudinal study, found that greater levels of perceived 
similarity upon first meeting a new freshman undergraduate roommate led to more trust 
over time (Whitmore & Dunsmore, 2014). Other researchers have found that perceived 
similarity between nurses and patients is associated with improved patient satisfaction; 
from which they deduce that high levels of perceived similarity between community 
health workers and patients likely improves patient trust as well (Sanders, Winters, & 
Fiscella, 2015). Moreover, when people perceive greater levels of similarity in others 
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(e.g., using manipulated facial photos), they show higher levels of cooperation and 
trustworthy behaviour (DeBruine, 2002).  
Taken together, this evidence suggests that similarity appears to be a reliable 
predictor of cooperation and trusting behaviour. Indeed, the effects of similarity 
manipulations replicate across various naturalistic and experimental settings using a 
variety of methods. Although we are confident that similarity relates to trust and 
cooperation, this body of research is not without its limitations. Specifically, similarity is 
often studied in a naturalistic or correlational manner (e.g., Glaeser, et al., 2000; Lui, et 
al., 2006; Whitmore & Dunsmore, 2014), meaning that other variables may be driving 
reported effects. Moreover, researchers often manipulate similarity along race or gender 
categories (e.g., Chen & Kenrick, 2002; Vang & Fox, 2013), meaning that stereotypes 
against obvious out-group members might be responsible for results, rather than 
similarity. Therefore, the extent to which similarity underpins research findings remains 
unclear.  
Much of the literature on trust decisions has assumed that similarity underpins 
decisions to trust, based on evidence showing that minimal group manipulations (e.g., 
same versus rival-university students (Montoya & Pittinsky, 2011)) enhance trust 
decisions. However, in the real world, these cause-effect relationships may be more 
complicated. For example, one may actively seek evidence of similarity with a social 
partner when one experiences trustworthy, fair, or cooperative behaviour. This, in turn, 
may lead to increased perceptions of similarity that stem from a tendency to minimize, 
not notice, or to forget differences. Indeed, in a clever paradigm in which participants 
invested with computerized trustees depicted by photographs, Farmer, McKay and 
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Tsakiris (2014), found that participants perceived trustworthy trustees as showing greater 
appearance similarity to themselves than untrustworthy trustees. Thus, it appears that 
perceived similarity leads to trust and trustworthy behaviour leads to perceived similarity.  
Without a strong objective manipulation of similarity levels, it is difficult to 
discern cause from effect in the similarity-trust relationship. Thus, it is currently 
impossible to determine whether similarity leads to trust or vice versa. Moreover, given 
that many trust decisions play out in real interpersonal environments, other social or 
interaction-level factors may have clear and important causal roles in understanding the 
development of trust decisions. Here we take the view that the quality of a social 
interaction independently contributes to trust decisions. Specifically, we examine how 
reciprocity of social behaviour (e.g., returning a social partner’s smile, nod or gesture) 
contributes to decisions to trust.  
Social reciprocity is important for three reasons. First, this factor is strongly 
apparent in face-to-face social interactions (Heerey & Kring, 2007; Heerey & Crossley, 
2013), including those that culminate in trust decisions. Second, reciprocity of an 
interaction is apparent nearly immediately, meaning that it is the first social cue one 
receives about their interaction partner. It is likely then that social reciprocity colours our 
interpretation of other social cues that occur later in the interaction sequence. Third, 
decisions to trust engender reciprocity norms (Pillutla, Malhotra, & Muringhan, 2003). 
That is, when people engage in acts of trust, they expect that their trustees will 
reciprocate this trust in kind (Malhotra, 2004). Thus, reciprocity of social behaviour may 
serve to communicate a social partner’s trustworthiness by providing information about 
the stability of the social environment (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushmore, 2008; 
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Behrens, Hunt, & Rushmore, 2009) and consequently the likelihood of social norm 
compliance.  
Behavioural mimicry, the inadvertent imitation of an interaction partner’s 
nonverbal behaviour or verbal style (Duffy & Chartrand, 2015), is one operational 
definition of social reciprocity. Mimicry between interaction partners predicts increased 
liking, cooperation, and trust (Duffy & Chartrand, 2015; Fischer et al., 2013; Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003; Seibt, Mühlberger, Likowksi, & Weyers, 2015). For example, in a study 
of interpersonal negotiations, individuals who engaged in mimicry were more likely to 
achieve successful outcomes than those who did not. Interestingly, this did not lead to 
negative outcomes for the person being mimicked. Rather, mimicry had an overall 
positive effect within the dyad (Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky 2008). Research has also 
consistently indicated that participants like and trust people and avatars, who mimic more 
than those who do not mimic (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Seibt 
et al., 2015). Mimicry may therefore be influential in creating rapport and bolstering 
interpersonal connections (Seibt et al., 2015).  
In real face-to-face interactions, instances of mimicry are a subset of a broader 
class of reciprocal social behaviours. Reciprocity refers to the active exchange of social 
information and may refer to verbal and nonverbal behaviours or feelings (Heerey & 
Crossley, 2013; King-Casas, et al., 2005). For example, evidence shows that people 
commonly exchange smiles in face-to-face encounters (Heerey & Crossley, 2013) and 
that people report greater liking for others who indicate liking for them (Montoya & 
Horton, 2012). Note that reciprocity is not necessarily positive. Indeed, in competitive 
encounters in which one player defects, other players often follow a “tit for tat” strategy, 
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mutually reciprocating defection or punishment (Axelrod, 1980; Van Lange & Visser, 
1999). While this strategy may be effective in the prisoner’s dilemma or other laboratory 
cooperation games (e.g., Duersch, Oechssler, & Schipper, 2014) it can be suboptimal in 
real-world social situations, such as the presence of conflict in the workplace (Andersson 
& Pearson, 1999)   
Reciprocity of behaviour and liking in face-to-face interactions may subsequently 
support the development of trust and cooperation. For example, without adequate levels 
of low-level behavioural reciprocity (e.g., nodding, smiling), an interaction may feel 
disfluent, awkward and uncomfortable (Delaherche et al., 2012), leading to poor 
outcomes, including reduced trust and willingness to cooperate with the social partner 
(Launay, Dea, & Bailes, 2013). Moreover, when reciprocal behaviours are tightly 
coupled in time, known as social synchrony (Delaherche et al., 2012), social interactions 
result in greater levels of rapport, cooperation, and overall perceptions of conversational 
“smoothness.”  
A growing body of research has suggested that temporal synchronization between 
interaction partners leads to an increase in cooperation (Kirschner & Tomasello, 2010; 
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2011; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). For example, it may precede 
the development of prosocial behaviour, cooperation, and positive emotion (Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013), as well as feelings of trust toward an interaction partner (Launay, Dean, & 
Bailes, 2013). Interestingly, temporal synchronization may spontaneously emerge when 
participants are asked to work cooperatively rather than competitively on a task (Bernieri, 
Davis, Rosenthal, & Knee, 1994), suggesting that people may treat the presence of 
temporal synchrony as a signal of cooperation. Thus, social synchrony, as with mimicry 
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and reciprocity, tends to have positive effects within dyads including increased rapport 
and feeling of smoothness or coordination during interaction (Wiltermuth & Heath, 
2009).  
Although interesting, the current mimicry literature suffers from several 
limitations. Chief among these is whether the observed mimicry is actually genuine 
mimicry. Specifically, whereas mimicry is the automatic and unintentional imitation of 
another’s behaviour (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008), it is not uncommon for 
researchers to code an instance of mimicry 10 or more seconds from the initiating 
behaviour and when the initiating behavour is no longer observable (e.g., Stel & Vonk, 
2010). Because interactions are extremely fast-paced and social cues may be fleeting 
(Yan, Wu, Liang, Chen, & Fu, 2013), the contingency between the initiating and 
response behaviours may be weak or non-existent by the time 10 seconds have elapsed. 
For example, the likelihood of smile reciprocity within unmanipulated interactions 
reaches asymptotic levels by approximately 4 seconds (Heerey & Crossley, 2013). In 
addition to the overlong time lapse, researchers also frequently instruct participants to 
mimic one another. Since real mimicry is automatic, unconscious, and unintentional 
(Seibt et al., 2015), this may lead to artificial or contrived interactions which differ on 
other characteristics besides the presence or absence of mimicry. 
1.1 Present Experiments 
Here, we are interested in how both similarity and social reciprocity shape 
interpersonal perception and subsequent trust-based decision-making. Because we treat 
similarity and reciprocity as independent variables, we use a minimal social context in 
which it is possible to reliably manipulate them. Specifically, participants in the present 
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experiments “interacted” with avatars, which they believed to be other participants, in the 
context of an online chat-room style environment. 
This work comprises three independent experiments. The purpose of the set of 
experiments was to examine how objective similarity between interaction partners, as 
well as social reciprocity, influence participants’ trust decisions. To manipulate objective 
similarity, we asked participants to respond to 20 questions that concern frequently 
exchanged information during the getting acquainted process (e.g., “Are you originally 
from Canada?”). We then allowed participants to exchange this information with a set of 
avatars that they believed were other participants. To manipulate similarity, the avatars’ 
responses matched participants’ responses with either high or low frequency. Our social 
reciprocity manipulation relied on the exchange of emojis (e.g., ) as a form of 
behavioural exchange during participants’ “interactions” with the avatars. A reciprocal 
interaction took place when an avatar’s emoji feedback matched that given by a 
participant (Chapter 2 provides additional detail). 
We measured trust in different ways across the experiments. In Experiment 1, we 
used a simple economic game, based on a “centipede game” (Rosenthal, 1981) in which 
two players take turns deciding whether to steal a pot of money or to pass it to their 
opponent. The money (and therefore the incentive for defection) doubles with each pass 
so participants should engage in a greater number of passes with opponents they believe 
to be trustworthy, relative to those they believe to be untrustworthy. In Experiments 2a 
and 2b, we measured trust with a classic investor/trustee game (Berg, Dickhaut, & 
McCabe, 1995). In an investor/trustee game, players are assigned to the investor or the 
trustee role on each round. The investor must make an investment ranging from 0% to 
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100% of an endowment they have received. The investment then “matures” and the 
trustee must choose which proportion of the matured investment (0% to 100%) to return 
to the investor. The amount invested indicates the degree to which an investor trusts a 
trustee whereas the return amount indicates the trustee’s actual trustworthiness.  
In our third experiment, we examine the degree to which manipulated similarity 
and reciprocity contribute to the “utility” or subjective desirability of another player as 
the target of a trust interaction. Here, we rely on a utility task in which participants 
choose amongst pairs of avatars for trust-related interactions (see Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944). Because participants respond to all possible avatar pairings several 
times, participants’ choices allow us to estimate the independent contributions of 
similarity and reciprocity in trust-related decision-making, as well as their interaction.  
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Chapter 2  
2 General Methodology 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 used exactly the same manipulation of similarity and 
reciprocity. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the details of these manipulations, 
along with the questionnaires used in the protocol. Because we measured trust differently 
depending on the experiment, trust measurement will be described within each 
experimental chapter. 
2.1 General Protocol 
Participants arrived to the lab in groups of five for a study “about how people get 
to know one another in an online environment.” In reality, participation in this study was 
independent and participants interacted with computerized avatars. We used 
computerized avatars, rather than a naturalistic interaction, because this was the only way 
to experimentally manipulate both similarity and social reciprocity and to ensure that the 
manipulation was identical across participants (Heerey, 2015; Schilbach et al., 2006). 
However, it was essential to our experimental design that participants believed they were 
actually becoming acquainted with real people. Inviting them to the lab in groups helped 
us to achieve this deception.  
Once a group of participants arrived at the lab, they were seated in individual testing 
rooms for the duration of the experiment. After consenting to the study procedure (see 
Appendix B), participants selected one of 16 possible avatar images (8 female and 8 
male) to represent them for the duration the experiment (see Figure 1). The avatar set 
consisted of vector graphics and was rated by an independent set of participants to 
determine the degree to which they were visually similar across avatars. After 
participants selected an avatar, the computer told them that another player had already 
selected their choice. The computer then asked them to select a second avatar, which was 
always allocated to the participant. The participant’s first choice of avatar always 
appeared in the experiment as one of the highly similar avatars. Pilot testing suggested 
that this procedure enhanced the believability of the experiment. The computer selected 
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the other three avatars with which participants interacted based on pre-rated similarity in 
appearance. One of these avatars was always highly similar in appearance to the 
participant’s own avatar. The remaining two avatars had been pre-rated as low in 
appearance similarity to the participant’s own avatar.  
2.2 Similarity 
Manipulation 
To manipulate objective 
similarity, we first asked 
participants to respond to 20 
“getting-acquainted” type 
questions (see Appendix C). 
Four of these items were high-
value “attitude” questions (i.e., 
“Would you consider yourself a 
feminist?”, “What would you 
most like to be someday?”, 
“Would you tend to see yourself 
as more liberal or more 
conservative?”, and “Do you 
have a religious affiliation?”). 
We based this designation on pre-screening data from an independent participant sample. 
This sample rated the items according to how important each item was to them and how 
important it would be for their friends to respond similarly. The remaining items were 
rated as less important on both dimensions. Participants saw and responded to these 
forced-choice multiple-choice questions in random order (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1. Avatar selection. Participants began the 
task by selecting an avatar to represent them within 
the game. 
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After participants responded to these 
questions, they “exchanged” answers 
with each of the other avatars. As 
displayed in Figure 3, participants 
viewed a screen containing the question, 
their own avatar and response and 
another avatar and that avatar’s response. 
They viewed responses to each of the 20 
questions for each avatar individually. 
The computer fully randomized the 
presentation order for the 80 items (20 
questions for each of four avatars).   
The computer manipulated similarity 
based on the participant’s responses to 
the 20 questions. Two avatars were 
“high” in similarity. These avatars mirrored more of the participant’s own responses to 
the initial questions. Specifically, high-similarity avatars matched the participants’ 
responses on the four “important” questions (e.g., “What would you most like to be 
someday?”). These avatars also matched on a random set of 12 of the less important 
items (e.g., “What’s your favourite cuisine?”). The two avatars that were low in similarity 
matched on fewer of the participant’s own responses to the 20 questions. These avatars 
did not match on any of the attitude questions but did match on a random set of four of 
the less important items. These numbers were selected based on pilot testing showing that 
“low-similarity” avatars who matched participants’ responses on none of the items 
detracted from the believability of the manipulation. 
 
Figure 2. Getting-acquainted question 
example. Participants answered a series of 
forced choice questions about themselves. 
The computer used their answers to 
manipulate objective similarity.  
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2.3 Social Reciprocity Manipulation 
The social reciprocity manipulation occurred conjointly with the similarity 
manipulation. Participants gave like/dislike feedback after viewing each avatar’s response 
to the similarity items. After viewing the similarity information, participants gave 
feedback to their partners using an emoji-style rating scale (Figure 4) similar to what one 
might see in a social media application. After participants indicated their feedback 
response (see Figure 4a), they saw a screen with their own emoji feedback and the 
avatar’s feedback. The avatar’s responses could either be reciprocal (matching) (e.g., 
Figure 4b) or non-reciprocal (non-matching; Figure 4c). Importantly, non-reciprocal 
feedback was 1-level more positive or 1-level more negative on the emoji scale than that 
of the participant such that the average discrepancy in the feedback positivity between 
avatars and participants was zero. Two avatars (one high in similarity and one low in 
similarity were low-reciprocity, and provided matching emojis on only 20% of trials. The 
remaining two avatars were high-reciprocity avatars and provided matching feedback on 
80% of trials.  
The task was programmed and presented in E-prime (v 2.0, Psychology Software). 
 
Figure 3. Answer exchange examples. (a) This represents an instance of high 
similarity. (b) This represents an instance of low similarity. Participants engaged 
in 80 exchanges across the four avatars. 
 
 
A            B 
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2.4 Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) 
The TIPI (See Appendix D; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) was 
administered at the end of the experimental manipulation of similarity and social 
reciprocity. The TIPI assumes a 5-factor personality structure and measures extraversion 
(“I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic), openness to experience (“I see myself as open 
to new experiences, complex”), agreeableness (“I see myself as sympathetic, warm”), 
emotional stability (“I see myself as calm, emotionally stable”), and conscientiousness (“I 
see myself as dependable, self-disciplined”). Participants rated each avatar and 
themselves using this instrument. We added one additional item to the avatar-ratings of 
the TIPI in every experiment (“I see [avatar picture] as similar to me”). In Experiments 2 
and 3 participants additionally rated each avatar on a second item (“I see [avatar picture] 
as in sync with my feelings”). These additional items served to measure the degree to 
which participants perceived the similarity and reciprocity manipulations. Participants 
rated each item on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Disagree strongly; 7 = Agree strongly).  
   
Figure 4. Social reciprocity feedback. (a) The feedback decision screen where the 
participant decides what feedback to give the avatar. (b) An example of a reciprocal 
feedback exchange. (c) An example a non-reciprocal feedback exchange. 
 
   A           B                    C  
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Chapter 3  
3 Experiment 1 
3.1 Introduction 
This experiment asks whether social reciprocity, in addition to similarity, influences 
trust decisions. To answer this question, we utilized an economic game to measure trust. 
Economic games have been used to measure trust behaviour for decades (e.g., Burnham, 
McCabe, & Smith, 2000; Costa-Gomes, Huck, & Weizsacker, 2014; Glaeser, et al., 2000; 
Ong, Zaki, & Gruber, 2017; Rotter, 1967). These games have also been demonstrated to 
be a valid measurement of trust behaviour (Brulhart & Usunier, 2012).  
3.1.1 Hypotheses 
This experiment had two hypotheses: 1) there will be a significant main effect of 
similarity on trust behaviour and 2) there will be a significant main effect of social 
reciprocity on trust behaviour, such that greater levels of both similarity and reciprocity 
will enhance trust. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Sixty-nine participants completed this study in exchange for partial course credit and 
a small monetary bonus, which was based on their performance in the trust game in this 
study. Of these 69, 13 were discarded from the analysis due to deception failure (they did 
not believe they had played real participants). The final sample therefore included fifty-
six undergraduate participants (14 male, mean age = 18.45, SD = .83). All participants 
gave documented informed consent and the University’s Ethics Committee approved all 
study procedures (likewise for Experiments 2 & 3).  
3.2.2 Procedures 
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To measure trust, we used a simple economic game, based on a “centipede” game 
(Rosenthal, 1981). In a traditional centipede game there are two players who take turns 
passing pots of money or points (in the present case), until one of them chooses to defect 
or some number of exchanges have happened (traditionally 100 exchanges). On any 
given turn, the active player 
receives two pots of money, 
one large and one small. The 
player then chooses to either 
take the larger of the two 
pots (giving the smaller to 
the other player) or to pass 
both pots to the other player. 
If a player chooses to pass the pots to the other player, the pots both double in size (see 
Figure 5). We selected this game because, unlike the prisoner’s dilemma and other 
common games (e.g., Kanazawa, & Fontaine, 2013; Sparks, Burleigh, & Barclay, 2016), 
it is designed as an iterated game, and with each pass of the pots, the incentive to defect 
increases.  
The dominant strategy in this game is for the first player to take the pot on the first 
round of the game (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992). However, humans rarely adhere to the 
dominant strategy in simple economic games (Mailath, 1998). One potential reason why 
players may make this choice is that they trust that their partners will not defect before 
they do. Indeed, if one trusts one’s partner not to defect, one’s payout is likely to be 
significantly larger with a cooperative strategy. Therefore, the number of rounds 
participants choose to pass the pots is a proxy for trust behaviour.  
A second advantage of using a centipede game over a commonly used Prisoner’s 
Dilemma or similar game is that participants are less likely to be familiar with it. In a 
typical undergraduate sample, there is a substantial risk that participants have 
encountered the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in a psychology class, experiment, or on 
television. In order to increase the likelihood that participants were naïve to the trust 
 
Figure 5. Centipede-style game used in Experiment 1. 
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measure, we opted for this less well known, yet still ecologically valid measurement of 
trust. 
Here we used a 10-round version of this game 
(see Figure 6), in which participants played with 
an avatar, that they believed to be a real partner. 
The version used in Experiment 1 either ended 
when the participant defected or when the game 
had reached ten rounds. The avatars were 
programmed to defect in round 10, if the 
participant had not already defected. Participants 
knew that they would receive their game earnings 
as a monetary bonus at the end of the experimental session. We manipulated similarity 
and reciprocity using the method described in Chapter 2. 
3.2.3 Data Analysis 
To examine trustworthiness, we tallied the number of rounds participants chose to 
pass the pots of points to each avatar. To test our hypotheses regarding the main effects 
of similarity and social reciprocity on trust behaviours we conducted a 2 x 2 repeated 
measures factorial ANOVA with avatar similarity (high, low) and avatar reciprocity 
(high, low) as the independent variables and total passes as the dependent variable.  
3.3 Results 
To ensure that manipulated level objective similarity enhanced perceptions of 
similarity, we conducted a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with similarity (low or high) 
and social reciprocity (low or high) as within subjects factors and the degree to which 
participants rated avatars as “similar to me” as the dependent variable revealed that 
participants rate high similarity avatars as more similar to themselves than low similarity 
avatars, F (1, 55) = 34.03, p < .001, ηρ2 = .382 (see Figure 7). There was no significant 
relationship between avatar reciprocity and similarity ratings, F (1, 55) = 3.89, p = .054, 
ηρ2 = .066, nor was there any interaction between the variables, F (1,55) = .054, p = .818, 
 
Figure 6. Participant decision 
screen in centipede-style game. 
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ηρ2 = .001. Though nonsignificant there does seem to be a trend for participants to rate 
highly reciprocal avatars as more similar to themselves than low reciprocity avatars. 
We also conducted a series of 
Pearson Correlations between 
self-rated personality and the 
avatar personality ratings to 
determine if highly similar avatars 
are rated as more similar to the 
self. Correlations between the low 
similarity, low reciprocity avatar 
and the self are predominantly 
non-significant (with the 
exception of extraversion), though 
trending in the negative direction 
(Extraversion: r = -.36, p = .007; 
Agreeableness: r = -.02, p = .874; 
Conscientiousness: r = -.15, p = .287; Emotional Stability: r = -.11, p = .419; Openness: r 
= -.08, p = .557). Correlations between the low similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the 
self follow the same trend as above (Extraversion: r = -.52, p < .001; Agreeableness: r = 
.07,  p = .625; Conscientiousness: r = -.14, p = .297; Emotional Stability: r = .00, p = 
.983; Openness: r = -.04,  p = .751). Correlations between the high similarity, low 
reciprocity avatar and the self are predominantly non-significant (with the exception of 
agreeableness), though trending in the positive directions (Extraversion: r = .00, p = .996; 
Agreeableness: r = .28, p = .037; Conscientiousness: r = .20, p = .135; Emotional 
Stability: r = .13, p =.349; Openness: r = .18, p = .194). Correlations between the high 
similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the self are non-significant, though predominantly 
trending in the positive direction (Extraversion: r = .18, p = .193; Agreeableness: r = .13, 
p = .352; Conscientiousness: r = -.04, p = .782; Emotional Stability: r = .22, p = .104; 
Openness: r = .04, p = .786). These results, along with the results from the 2 x 2 ANOVA 
above suggest that our similarity manipulation achieved its desired effect.   
 
Figure 7. Manipulation check for similarity. 
Participants rate the highly similar avatars as 
more similar to themselves than the less similar 
avatars. Error bars show the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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A second 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA with similarity 
(low or high) and social 
reciprocity (low or high) as within 
subject factors and the total 
rounds played with each avatar as 
the dependent variable, revealed 
both a main effect of similarity, F 
(1, 55) = 7.42, p = .009, ηρ2 = 
.119, and a main effect of social 
reciprocity, F (1,55) = 11.75, p = 
.001, ηρ2 = .176 (see Figure 8a). 
In both cases, consistent with 
hypotheses, higher levels of 
similarity and reciprocity lead to 
greater trust. The similarity by 
social reciprocity interaction was 
non-significant, F (1,55) = 1.59, p 
= .213, ηρ2 = .028, suggesting that 
these effects are independent.  
Interestingly, a number of 
participants (N = 3) opted to 
defect on all avatars in Round 1 
(i.e., they played the dominant 
strategy). However, because the game with any given avatar ended when the participant 
defected, an alternate explanation for these results might be that savvy research-pool-
recruited participants were simply attempting to end their testing sessions early. To 
examine this possibility, we repeated the analysis excluding any participant who defected 
on the first trial with all four avatars. To balance this, we also excluded any participant 
who stayed in the game for all 10 rounds with all four avatars, as these participants may 
not have understood the task (N = 3). This analysis therefore included 50 participants. As 
A 
 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
Figure 8. Main effects of similarity and social 
reciprocity. Participants play more rounds with 
avatars who are highly similar and highly 
reciprocal in comparison to those who are low in 
similarity and reciprocity. (a) Analysis on 56 
participants, (b) analysis on 50 participants. Error 
bars show the 95% confidence intervals 
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above, we found a significant main effect of similarity, F (1, 49) = 7.52, p = .008, ηρ2 = 
.133, and a significant main effect of social reciprocity, F (1, 49) = 12.03, p = .001, ηρ2 = 
.197. The similarity by social reciprocity interaction was non-significant, F (1, 49) = 
1.59, p = .213, ηρ2 = .031. Thus, these results suggest that similarity and social reciprocity 
indeed contribute to trust decisions independently of one another (see Figure 8b). 
3.4 Discussion 
Taken together, these results support both of our hypotheses. We found significant 
main effects of both similarity and social reciprocity on trust behaviour. Specifically, 
people are more trusting of those who express similar preferences and whose behaviour 
demonstrates greater levels of social reciprocity than they are of people who are less 
similar and behave less reciprocally. The lack of an interaction effects suggest that 
similarity and social reciprocity operate independently in terms of their contributions to 
trust decisions. 
These data therefore suggest that in addition similarity, which is a well-established 
predictor of trust, social reciprocity independently contributes to these decisions. 
However, one limitation of this study was that some participants may have quickly 
realized that defection was a way to shorten the study session. This means that after an 
initial defection, participants might have opted to defect in order to avoid completing 
more trust trials. In order to ensure that such experiment-levels variables did not explain 
the results, we conducted a second set of experiments, using a different measure of trust.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Experiment 2 
4.1 Introduction 
This experiment replicates findings from Experiment 1 using a different economic 
game. The aim of Experiment 2 is therefore twofold. First, we sought to resolve 
limitations in Experiment 1 by choosing an “investor-trustee” game (Berg, Dickhaut, & 
McCabe, 1995) in which participants must complete all rounds but may vary their 
economic strategies depending on their opponent. Second, we aimed to determine 
whether the effect of social reciprocity as a predictor of trust behaviour is robust by 
examining whether it replicates in another task context.  
The investor-trustee game is an economic game that is often used in psychological 
research (e.g., King-Casas, et al., 2005; Kosfeld, Heinirchs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 
2005; Shore & Heerey, 2013). In the typical version of this game, the “investor” receives 
an endowment and must then choose how much of the endowment to invest with a 
“trustee.” If money is invested, the trustee receives a “matured” investment. In typical 
games, the matured amount is typically triple the original investment (Berg, Dickhaut, & 
McCabe, 1995). The trustee then chooses how much of the investment to return to the 
investor. Thus, the amount invested indicates the degree to which the investor trusts the 
trustee and the return indicates the trustee’s actual trustworthiness. In addition to the 
initial replication experiment (here labeled Experiment 2a) we also completed a direct 
replication of this task (Experiment 2b) to ensure the reliability of our results. 
4.1.1 Hypotheses 
As above, we predicted significant and independent main effects of both 
similarity and social reciprocity on trust behaviour, such that greater levels of both 
similarity and reciprocity will enhance trust, as measured by investments in an iterated 
version of the investor-trustee game. The hypotheses for Experiment 2b were pre-
registered on the Open Science Framework (OSF; Heerey & Clerke, 2017 
(osf.io/dv7np)).  
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4.2 Experiment 2a and b 
4.2.1 Methods 
4.2.1.1 Participants  
4.2.1.1.1 Experiment 2a 
Seventy-four participants completed this study in exchange for partial course credit 
and a small monetary bonus, which was based on their performance in the investor-
trustee game. Of these 74, 9 were discarded from the analysis due to deception failure 
(they did not believe they had played real participants). The final sample therefore 
included sixty-five undergraduate participants (17 male, mean age = 18.63, SD = .86).  
4.2.1.1.2 Experiment 2b 
Eighty-five participants completed this study in exchange for partial course credit and 
a small monetary bonus, which was based on their performance in the investor-trustee 
game. Of these 85, 13 were discarded from the analysis due to deception failure. The 
final sample therefore included seventy-two participants (19 male, mean age = 18.70, SD 
= 1.14). 
4.2.1.2 Procedures 
Here we used a 10-round version of this game 
in which each participant played 5 rounds as the 
investor and 5 rounds as the trustee with each 
avatar (see Figure 9). Asking participants to play 
both game roles allowed us to both maintain the 
deception that they played real partners and 
allowed us to examine differences in both trusting 
behaviour and trustworthiness for each 
participant. As in Experiment 1, participants believed that the avatar was a real partner. 
They played all game rounds in random order and without feedback, meaning that they 
did not know what portion of their investment had been returned to them when they 
played the investor role. We did this to ensure that the presence of feedback did not shape 
 
Figure 9. Example of a turn of 
the investor-trustee game. 
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subsequent trials. In the investor role, participants received a 10-point endowment and 
chose what proportion to invest with their partner on the round. We allowed participants 
to choose from the full range of the endowment (0% to 100%).  
When the participant played the trustee role, they chose what proportion of the 
matured investment to return to their partner, ranging from 0% to 100%. To ensure that 
participants’ behaviour was not affected by differential investment amounts across the 
avatars, we controlled this variable. Over the course of the five trustee-role trials with 
each avatar, participants received investments of 3 points, 4 points, 5 points, 6 points and 
7 points. These trial orders were fully randomized to minimize the chance of participants 
guessing the nature of our manipulation. Debriefing data confirmed that no participant 
guessed this manipulation. Finally, participants knew that they would receive their game 
earnings as a monetary bonus at the end of the experimental session.  
Prior to the investor trustee game, we manipulated similarity and reciprocity using 
the method described in Chapter 2. 
4.2.1.3 Data Analysis  
To examine participants’ beliefs about avatar trustworthiness, we calculated the 
average number of points that a participant invested with each avatar. We also calculated 
the proportion of the original investment that a participant returned to each avatar when 
in the trustee role. These data served as the dependent variables in our analyses 
4.2.2  Results  
4.2.2.1 Experiment (2a) 
To test whether our similarity and social reciprocity manipulation effectively 
altered perceptions of similarity and feelings of being “in sync,” we conducted two 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVAs with similarity (low or high) and social reciprocity (low or 
high) as within subjects factors and the degree to which participants rated avatars as 
“similar to me” and “in sync with me” as the dependent variables, respectively. Results 
from the first ANOVA revealed that participants rated high similarity avatars as more 
similar to themselves than low similarity avatars, F (1, 58) = 13.90, p < .001, ηρ2 = .193, 
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and that they rated high reciprocity 
avatars as more similar to 
themselves than low reciprocity 
avatars, F (1, 58) = 16.73, p < 
.001, ηρ2 = .224 (see Figure 10).  
There was no significant 
interaction between the two 
variables, F (1, 58) = .67, p = .416, 
ηρ2 = .011. These results suggest 
that although our manipulation of 
similarity achieved its desired 
effect, it was jointly influenced by 
the reciprocity manipulation. 
Results from the second ANOVA 
revealed that participants rated 
highly reciprocal avatars as more in sync with themselves than low reciprocity avatars, F 
(1, 58) = 31.81, p < .001, ηρ2 = .354, and that participants rate highly similar avatars as 
more in sync with themselves than low similarity avatars, F (1, 58) = 15.38, p < .001, ηρ2 
= .210. There was also a significant interaction between the two variables, F = (1, 58) = 
4.64, p = .035, ηρ2 = .074, which suggests that the highly similar and highly reciprocal 
avatar is rated as most in sync and the low similar, low reciprocity avatar as least in sync 
with the participants (see Figure 10). These results suggest that although our reciprocity 
manipulation achieved its desired effect, it was influenced by our similarity manipulation. 
Ratings on the similarity and social reciprocity manipulation checks are significantly 
correlated with one another, r = .79, p < .001. 
We also conducted a series of Pearson Correlations between self-rated personality 
and the avatar personality ratings to determine if highly similar avatars are rated as more 
similar to the self. Correlations between the low similarity, low reciprocity avatar and the 
self were non-significant (with the exception of openness; Extraversion: r = -.02, p = 
.896; Agreeableness: r = .16, p = .200; Conscientiousness: r = .02, p = .854; Emotional 
Stability: r = .14, p = .263; Openness: r = .26, p = .037). Correlations between the low 
Figure 10. Manipulation check for similarity and 
social reciprocity. Participants rate the highly 
similar and reciprocal avatars as more similar to 
and in sync with themselves than the less similar 
and reciprocal avatars. Error bars show the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
. 
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similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the self are largely non-significant, with the 
exception of agreeableness (Extraversion: r = -.10, p = .420; Agreeableness: r = .26, p = 
.040; Conscientiousness: r = .00, p = .943; Emotional Stability: r = .03, p = .817; 
Openness: r = .05, p = .705). Correlations between the high similarity, low reciprocity 
avatar and the self are predominantly non-significant (with the exception of 
agreeableness), though mostly trending in the positive direction (Extraversion: r = -.06, p 
= .610; Agreeableness: r = .25, p = .049; Conscientiousness: r = .06, p = .638; Emotional 
Stability: r = .15, p =.231; Openness: r = .08, p = .547). Correlations between the high 
similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the self are predominantly non-significant (with the 
exception of agreeableness and openness), though mostly trending in the positive 
direction (Extraversion: r = -.02, p = .882; Agreeableness: r = .39, p = .001; 
Conscientiousness: r = .226, p = .070; Emotional Stability: r = .05, p = .712; Openness: r 
= .318, p = .010). These results suggest that participants were more likely to rate high 
similarity avatar the same way they rated themselves, though not significantly. 
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Another 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA with 
similarity (low or high) and 
social reciprocity (low or high) 
as within subjects factors and the 
average points invested with 
each avatar as the dependent 
variable, revealed both a main 
effect of similarity, F (1, 64) = 
6.59, p = .013, ηρ2 = .093, and a 
main effect of social reciprocity, 
F (1, 64) = 6.28, p = .015, ηρ2 = 
.089 (see Figure 11a). In both 
cases, consistent with 
hypotheses, higher levels of 
similarity and reciprocity lead to 
greater trust. The similarity by 
social reciprocity interaction was 
non-significant, F (1, 64) = .33, p 
= .570, ηρ2 = .005, suggesting 
that these effects are 
independent.  
An exploratory 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA with 
similarity (low or high) and 
social reciprocity (low or high) 
as within subjects factors and the average proportion of points returned to each avatar as 
a dependent variable revealed a main effect of social reciprocity, F (1, 64) = 4.82, p = 
.032, ηρ2 = .070, and a significant interaction between similarity and social reciprocity, F 
(1, 64) = 4.51, p = .038, ηρ2 = .066. There was no significant main effect of similarity, F 
(1, 64) = .031, p = .861, ηρ2 = .000 (see Figure 11b). 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Effects of similarity and social 
reciprocity. (a) Participants invest more with 
highly similar and highly reciprocal avatars then 
with avatars who are low in similarity and social 
reciprocity. (b) Participants returned a greater 
proportion of the initial investment to highly 
reciprocal avatars. This effect is amplified when 
similarity is also high. Error bars show the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
 
A 
 
 
 
 
 
B 
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4.2.2.2 Experiment 2b 
We tested the effectiveness of 
our similarity and social reciprocity 
manipulations in the same way it was 
described in Experiment 2a. The 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA that had 
the degree to which participants rated 
the avatars as “similar to me” as the 
dependent variable revealed that 
participants rate highly similar 
avatars as more similar to themselves 
than low similarity avatars, F (1, 71) 
= 60.16, p < .001, ηρ2 = .459, and that 
participants rate highly reciprocal 
avatars as more similar to themselves 
than low reciprocity avatars, F (1, 71) 
= 4.35, p = .041, ηρ2 = .058. There 
was no significant interaction 
between the two variables, F (1, 71) = .26, p = .609, ηρ2 = .004. This suggests that, as 
above, although our similarity manipulation had the desired effect but it was influenced 
by our social reciprocity manipulation as well. The 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA that 
had the degree to which participants rated the avatars as “in sync with me” as the 
dependent variable revealed that participants did not rate highly reciprocal avatars as 
more in sync with themselves than low reciprocity avatars, F (1, 71) = 2.64, p =.109, ηρ2 
= .036, and that participants do rate highly similar avatars as more in sync with them than 
low similarity avatars, F (1, 71) = 31.00, p < .001, ηρ2 = .304. There was no significant 
interaction between the two variables, F (1,71) = .75, p = .390, ηρ2 = .010. These results 
suggest that participants may not have attended to our social reciprocity manipulation to 
the same degree as in other experiments. Ratings on the similarity and social reciprocity 
manipulation checks are significantly correlated with one another, r = .79, p < .001. 
 
Figure 12. Manipulation check for similarity 
and social reciprocity. Participants rate highly 
similar and highly reciprocal avatar as more 
similar to themselves than avatars who are low 
in similarity and reciprocity. Participants rate 
highly similar avatars as more in sync with 
themselves but not highly reciprocal avatars in 
comparison to avatars that are low on these 
variables. Error bars show the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Like above, we conducted a series of Pearson Correlations between self-rated 
personality and the avatar personality ratings to determine if highly similar avatars are 
rated as more similar to the self. Correlations between the low similarity, low reciprocity 
avatar and the self are predominantly non-significant (with the exception of extraversion), 
though trending in the negative directions (Extraversion: r = -.25, p = .031; 
Agreeableness: r = -.07, p = .583; Conscientiousness: r = -.05, p = .698; Emotional 
Stability: r = -.07, p = .536; Openness: r = -.16, p = .168). Correlations between the low 
similarity, high reciprocity avatar (Extraversion: r = -.05, p =.691; Agreeableness: r = -
.09, p = .467; Conscientiousness: r = -.05, p = .672; Emotional Stability: r = .04, p = .742; 
Openness: r = -.15, p = .202) and the high similarity, low reciprocity avatar 
(Extraversion: r = -.19, p = .166; Agreeableness: r = .20, p = .086; Conscientiousness: r = 
.15, p = .208; Emotional Stability: r = .20, p =.085; Openness: r = .10, p = .422) are non-
significant. Correlations between the high similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the self 
are predominantly non-significant (with the exception of extraversion and openness) 
though trending in the positive direction (Extraversion: r = .25, p = .037; Agreeableness: r 
= .21, p = .079; Conscientiousness: r = .17, p = .151; Emotional Stability: r = .15, p = 
.217; Openness: r = .36, p = .002). These results suggest that participants are rating the 
high similarity and high reciprocity avatar as more similar to the self. 
Another 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with similarity (low or high) and social 
reciprocity (low or high) as within subjects factors and the average points invested with 
each avatar as the dependent variable revealed both a main effect of similarity, F (1,71) = 
13.46, p < .001, ηρ2 = .159, and of social reciprocity, F (1, 71) = 8.10, p = .006, ηρ2 = 
.102. There was no significant interaction between the two variables, F (1, 71) = .10, p = 
.749, ηρ2 = .001. These data are consistent with the Experiment 2a results.  
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A final exploratory 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA with 
similarity (low or high) and social 
reciprocity (low or high) as within 
subjects factors and the average 
proportion of points returned to 
each avatar as the dependent 
variable revealed no significant 
main effects of similarity, F (1,71) 
= 3.70, p = .058, ηρ2 = .050, or 
social reciprocity, F (1,71) = .04, p 
= .848, ηρ2 = .001. There was no 
significant interaction between the 
two variables, F (1,71) = .65, p = 
.425, ηρ2 = .009. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
Taken together, these results 
support both of our main 
hypotheses. We found significant 
main effects of both similarity and 
social reciprocity on trust 
behaviour, as in Experiment 1. 
Specifically, people trust those who 
are higher similarity and reciprocity 
than people who are lower in 
similarity and reciprocity. However, 
when we examined the degree to which our participants behaved in a trustworthy manner 
themselves, we saw only reciprocity emerge as a factor, along with a similarity by 
reciprocity interaction in Experiment 2a. In Experiment 2b, the trustworthiness of 
participants’ own behaviour was not affected by avatar similarity or reciprocity levels.  
 
 
Figure 13. Effects of similarity and social 
reciprocity. (a) Participants invest more with 
avatars who are highly similar and high in 
reciprocity in comparison to avatars who are 
low in similarity and social reciprocity. (b) 
Participant’s own trustworthiness is not effect 
by the similarity or reciprocity levels of the 
avatars. Error bars show the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
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Chapter 5  
5 Experiment 3 
5.1 Introduction 
This experiment aimed to replicate the findings of Experiments 1 & 2 using social 
rather than financial decisions. Thus, the purpose of this experiment was to test the 
robustness of similarity and social reciprocity as predictors of trust behaviour in social 
scenarios. In addition, this experiment sought to further disentangle the contributions of 
similarity and reciprocity to trust decisions. Recall that in our manipulation (see Chapter 
2), similarity and reciprocity are fully crossed (i.e., each avatar’s behaviour is either high 
or low on similarity and likewise on reciprocity. The high similarity/high reciprocity 
avatar appeared to be the most trustworthy across the data sets. Thus, participants’ 
decisions may reflect the additive value of similarity and reciprocity together. This makes 
it somewhat difficult to determine how these variables independently contribute to choice 
behaviour.  
Here, we use an idea from expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morganstern, 
1947) to disentangle these effects. Specifically, we ask how participants apportion their 
choices across pairs of avatars, depending on how those avatars differ in similarity and 
reciprocity. This method essentially uses a “transitivity” task to examine the strength of 
participants’ preferences across the decision space. This means that we ask participants to 
make a decision using information they have already learned about each avatar. Based on 
participants’ decisions, we then model the degree to which avatar similarity and 
reciprocity determine the architecture of choice behaviour, or avatar utility, across a set 
of social trust decisions. This type of design is a common method for examining 
preferences within a decision space (e.g., Chung, Christopoulos, King-Casas, Ball, & 
Chiu, 2015; Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004; Kandasamy et al., 2014) 
5.1.1 Hypotheses 
As in the first two experiments, we predicted significant effects of both similarity 
and social reciprocity on trust decisions, such that greater levels of both similarity and 
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social reciprocity will enhance trust, as measured by decisions in a utility task. This 
experiment also has a third hypothesis that social reciprocity will contribute more to 
social decisions than similarity, such that social reciprocity will be a more important 
predictor of choices than similarity. We expect this because in real-world interactions, 
social reciprocity may be the first interpersonal characteristic that people notice after 
appearance similarity, so it is likely that it shapes our perceptions of people on a whole 
more so than similarity. These hypotheses were pre-registered prior to data-collection on 
the OSF (Heerey & Clerke, 2017 (osf.io/dv7np)).  
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
Ninety-seven participants completed this study in exchange for partial course credit. Of 
these ninety-seven, nine were discarded from the analysis due to deception failure and 
five additional participants were discarded due to poor performance on the decision task. 
Poor performance on the decision task was defined as having made a choice in less than 
350ms on 25% or more of the test trials. This data exclusion decision was made based on 
N400 research which suggests that at least 350-400ms is necessary for people to read and 
understand short phrases, like those in our decision task (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; Kutas 
& Federmeier, 2011). Thus responses that are shorter than 350ms are likely to be 
anticipatory responding that is not representative of deliberate decision making. The final 
sample therefore included eighty-five undergraduate participants (23 male, mean age = 
18.68, SD = 1.29). 
5.2.2 Procedures 
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As in Experiments 1 and 2, the task began 
with our standard manipulation of similarity and 
reciprocity. In this Experiment, we measured trust 
using a social decision making task in which 
participants chose one of two avatars to engage 
with in a hypothetical trust scenario in each trial 
(e.g., who would you rather lend your car keys to, 
who would you ask to be your designated driver; 
see Figure 14a and Appendix E). The trust items 
were pre-rated by an independent set of participants 
based on 1) the extent to which each scenario 
affects the average university undergraduate student 
and 2) the extent to which the item is a good 
indicator of whether or not one trusts someone.  
Participants viewed each of the six possible 
avatar pairings (see Figure 14b) for each of 14 trust 
items, meaning that there were 84 test trials. The 
placement of the avatars within each choice pair 
was counterbalanced so that each avatar appeared 
on the left and on the right side of the pairing on an 
equal number of trials. How participants apportion 
their choices across this decision space tells us how 
they are using the relative difference between 
avatar similarity and reciprocity to guide their 
choices. 
5.2.3 Data Analysis 
To examine the degree to which avatar similarity and reciprocity shaped choice 
behaviour, we individually modeled each participant’s choices using a logistic model to 
fit the data. The model predicted the likelihood that a participant would select the avatar 
on the left, given the characteristics of avatar on the right. The model included terms for 
 
Figure 14. Utility task. (a) 
Utility task decision screen. (b) 
Six possible avatar pairings. 
 
A 
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avatar similarity and reciprocity, coded as the difference between the left avatar and the 
right one for each variable. We used a standard logistic model to fit the choice data.  
 
The parameter θ in the logistic equation was estimated as: 
 
 In this equation, the βs are the estimated, unstandardized regression weights. β0 
refers to the intercept; β1 is the degree to which similarity influenced choice behaviour; β2 
is the estimated regression weight for social reciprocity; and β3 is the similarity x social 
reciprocity interaction. The Xs in the equation represent the difference between the avatar 
on the left and the avatar on the right for similarity (X1), social reciprocity (X2), and the 
similarity by social reciprocity interaction (X3). The model used an iteratively re-
weighted least squared algorithm to obtain the maximum likelihood estimate for each of 
the terms (O’Leary, D.P., 1990). The more these values differ from zero, the greater the 
influence of each term on participants’ decisions. 
Participants’ unstandardized regression weights for similarity, social reciprocity, 
and the similarity x social reciprocity interaction were subsequently examined using one-
sample t-tests against a test value of zero. This allowed us to test whether participants 
used these values to guide choice behaviour in the task. To examine their relative 
weightings, we conducted a paired samples t-test.  
5.3 Results 
To test whether our manipulations of similarity and social reciprocity had their 
desired effect, we conducted two 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs with similarity (low 
or high) and social reciprocity (low or high) as within subjects factors and the degree to 
which participants rated avatars as “similar to me” and “in sync with me” as the 
respective dependent variables. Results revealed that participants rated highly similar 
36 
 
avatars as more similar to 
themselves, F (1, 84) = 32.86, p < 
.001, ηρ2 = .281, and that 
participants rated highly 
reciprocal avatars as more similar 
to themselves, F (1, 84) = 25.94, 
p < .001, ηρ2 = .236 (see Figure 
15). Results from the second 
analysis revealed that participants 
rated highly reciprocal avatars as 
more in sync with themselves, F 
(1, 84) = 16.83, p < .001, ηρ2 = 
.167, and that participants rated 
highly similar avatars as more in 
sync with themselves, F (1, 84) = 
20.61, p < .001, ηρ2 = .197. There was no significant interaction between the two 
variables, F (1, 84) = 1.70, p = .196, ηρ2 = .020 (see Figure 15). Ratings on the similarity 
and social reciprocity manipulation checks are significantly correlated with one another, r 
= .76, p < .001. 
As in the previous experiments, we conducted a series of Pearson Correlations 
between self-rated personality and the avatar personality ratings to determine if highly 
similar avatars are rated as more similar to the self. Correlations between the low 
similarity, low reciprocity avatar and the self are predominantly non-significant (with the 
exception of extraversion and openness to experience) but are trending in the negative 
direction (Extraversion: r = -.31, p = .004; Agreeableness: r = -.12, p = .264; 
Conscientiousness: r = .15, p = .176; Emotional Stability: r = .10, p = .374; Openness: r = 
-.24, p = .029). Correlations between the low similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the 
self are non-significant (Extraversion: r = -.11, p =.319; Agreeableness: r = .182, p = 
.095; Conscientiousness: r = .07, p = .516; Emotional Stability: r = .06, p = .613; 
Openness: r = .12, p = 265). Correlations between the high similarity, low reciprocity 
avatar are largely non-significant, with the exception of conscientiousness (Extraversion: 
 
Figure 15. Manipulation check for similarity and 
social reciprocity. Participants rate highly similar 
and highly reciprocal avatars as more similar to 
and in sync with themselves than low similarity 
and low reciprocity avatars. Error bars show the 
95% confidence intervals. 
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r = .03, p = .785; Agreeableness: r 
= .14, p = .190; Conscientiousness: 
r = .23, p = .035; Emotional 
Stability: r = -.05, p =.660; 
Openness: r = .09, p = .416). 
Correlations between the high 
similarity, high reciprocity avatar 
and the self are also predominantly 
non-significant (with the exception 
of openness) though trending in 
the positive direction 
(Extraversion: r = .11, p = .307; 
Agreeableness: r = .05, p = .630; 
Conscientiousness: r = .20, p = 
.063; Emotional Stability: r = -.15, 
p = .170; Openness: r = .24, p = 
.031).  
To test whether similarity and 
social reciprocity had a significant 
effect on trust decisions, we 
conducted a set of one-sample t-
test with the means of the 
unstandardized regression weights 
(β-values) as the test variables. 
Results revealed that both 
similarity, t (84) = 6.10, p < .001, 
and social reciprocity, t (84) = 4.46, p < .001, were significantly different from zero 
indicating that both influenced trust decisions. The interaction between the two variables 
was non-significant, t (84) = -1.72, p = .090 (see Figures 16 and 17). A paired-samples t-
test with the beta-values of similarity and social reciprocity as the test variables revealed 
 
Figure 16. Effects of similarity and social 
reciprocity. Similarity and social reciprocity 
contribute equally to trust decisions. Error bars 
show the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Probability of choice behaviour given 
avatar characteristics. Error bars show the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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that the two variables are not significantly different from one another, t (84) = .72, p = 
.47. This means that similarity and social reciprocity contribute equally to trust decisions.  
5.4 Discussion 
These results support two of our three hypotheses. We found that, as in Experiments 1 
and 2, similarity and social reciprocity both significantly affected trust decisions. 
Specifically, people trust those who are more similar and behave more reciprocally than 
people who are lower in similarity and reciprocity. However, when we examined the 
difference between similarity and social reciprocity in terms of their independent 
contributions to trust decisions, we found no significant difference. Thus, both similarity 
and social reciprocity contributed to trust decisions in a similar fashion. Contrary to our 
prediction however, reciprocity was not weighted more heavily than similarity, even 
though it may be apparent in real-world decisions before interaction partners know 
enough information about each other to make similarity judgments.  
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Chapter 6 
6 Meta-
Analyses 
Meta-analyses 
combine data from 
several experiments 
and/or studies to better 
estimate the true effect of 
an independent variable 
within a population. 
Here, we conducted two 
meta-analyses of the 
results from Experiments 
1, 2, and 3 to determine 
the overall effect size of 
similarity and social 
reciprocity. The meta-
analysis was conducted 
with the statistical 
software package R (R 
Core Team, 2017; 
Viechtbauer, 2010) using 
Pearson’s r coefficients 
as measures of effect 
size. We chose to use 
Pearson’s r coefficient 
because it is one of the 
easier effect size metrics 
to interpret given that it 
 
 
Figure 18. Meta-analyses. (a) Meta-analysis of the 
similarity effect across experiments. (b) Meta-analysis of 
the reciprocity effect across experiments. 
A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B 
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ranges from 0 to ±1.The first meta-analysis (see Figure 17a) revealed that the overall 
effect for the main effect of similarity across studies was r = .42 (CI: 0.30 to .54). The 
second meta-analysis (see Figure 17b) revealed that the overall effect for the main effect 
of social reciprocity across studies was r = .38 (CI: .28 to .48). Thus, results show that 
there is a consistent effect for both similarity and reciprocity as predictors of trust 
development. 
These findings support our hypotheses across the set of experiments as a whole. 
They also indicate that the effect sizes for both similarity and reciprocity are comparable 
in strength. Together, these results indicate that models of trust development must 
account for social reciprocity, in addition to similarity across participants.  
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Chapter 7 
7 General Discussion 
Experiments 1 and 2 reliably demonstrate that similarity and social reciprocity are 
important contributors to financial trust decisions. Moreover, they demonstrate that these 
two variables operate independently (i.e. there is no significant interaction). Experiment 
2a also showed that people behave in a more trustworthy fashion themselves when their 
interaction partners are high in social reciprocity. Interestingly, this effect did not 
generalize to similarity. In Experiment 2b, there was no effect of similarity or social 
reciprocity on participant’s own trustworthiness, although this may have been related to 
the weak manipulation check results. Experiment 3 additionally shows that after 
controlling for one another, similarity and social reciprocity both contribute equally and 
significantly to decisions to trust in social contexts.  
The notion that similarity and social reciprocity both contribute equally to 
decisions to trust is important, given that previous work has almost entirely 
conceptualized similarity, in appearance, group membership or attitudes, as the largest 
contributor to these decisions (e.g., DeBruine, 2002; Goette, Huffman, & Meier, 2006; 
MacDonald, Schug, Chase, & Barth, 2013; Williams, 2001; Ziegler & Golbeck, 2007). 
One reason why the literature has conceptualized similarity as singularly important is that 
similarity is easier to manipulate and measure in both experimental and observational 
contexts than social reciprocity (Diehl 1990; Heerey, 2015). However, in real-world 
interactions, social reciprocity may be apparent before anything other than physical 
similarity. That is, interaction partners must interact in some fashion in order to learn that 
they have similar interests, attitudes, beliefs, etc. This interaction necessarily involves the 
exchange of contingent social cues (Cialdini & Golstein, 2004; Heerey & Crossley, 
2013). Thus, social reciprocity has temporal precedence over similarity in the real world.  
It is probable that high levels of social reciprocity during interaction shapes how 
people interpret the level of similarity between themselves and an interaction partner. For 
example, manipulation check findings from Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that high levels 
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of social reciprocity influence perceived levels of similarity, such that people perceive 
highly reciprocal avatars as more similar to themselves than avatars that engage in less 
social reciprocity. This suggests that social reciprocity, which makes interactions feel 
smoother and more fluent (Delaherche et al., 2012), may have heuristic value as an 
indicator of similarity. When interactions feel more fluent, interaction partners perceive 
more similarity, which then leads to higher levels of trust. Thus, reciprocity may be a 
nonverbal indicator of similarity, which people interpret as trustworthiness.  
From a theoretical perspective, this idea makes sense as reciprocity can be defined 
as the contingent exchange of social cues, which implies a similarity of interaction style. 
Without expected levels of reciprocity, people’s interaction styles may lead to greater 
disfluency and awkwardness. Both interpersonal similarity and social reciprocity have 
been linked to smoothness and comfort of an interaction, which indicates that both may 
be necessary for a successful interaction (Byrne, 1971; Delaherche, et al., 2012). This 
may be because the two variables are tightly linked with one another, meaning that they 
may be perceived as a joint aspect of person perception.  
Social reciprocity may also change the way people actively acquire social 
information. For example, if reciprocity is high, people may feel that their initial 
interactions are smoother and more coordinated and experience this as positive or 
rewarding (Delaherche et al., 2012). They may subsequently seek out points of similarity 
between themselves and their interaction partners, as similarities in interests and attitudes 
may form the foundation of friendships by providing a source of common ground 
(Youyou, et al., 2017). This could mean that people perceive others as more similar to 
themselves even when objectively similarity levels are lower. This is consistent with the 
notion that similarity need not be objective to enhance trust (Sanders et al., 2015; 
Whitmore & Dunsmore, 2014). Thus, social reciprocity may underpin similarity 
perception and consequently shape trust decisions. 
Even though reciprocity may shape perceptions of similarity, our data suggest that 
perceived similarity reliably influences decisions to trust, meaning that it is still an 
important factor in longer-term relationships in which people get to know one another 
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more deeply. However, in minimal interactions between strangers, it is plausible that 
social reciprocity acts as a guiding heuristic for trust-based decisions because reciprocity 
may be more immediately available in real social encounters. However, when people 
have the opportunity to get to know one another, perceived similarity is likely influenced 
by variables other than reciprocity, which demonstrates the independent contribution of 
perceptions of similarity.  
Both similarity and social reciprocity may be influencing trust-based decisions via 
a fluency effect. Specifically, information about similarity and reciprocity, which is more 
readily available than information about actual trustworthiness, become a proxy measure 
of interpersonal trustworthiness. This may be especially true in the short-interactions 
between strangers that are commonplace in the experimental setting in which this work is 
based. For instance, in a five-minute interaction there are many instances where social 
reciprocity and similarities may become apparent but this is less likely for 
trustworthiness. Further, given that similarity and social reciprocity are commonplace in 
interactions (Oullier, de Guzman, Jantzen, Lagarde, & Kelso, 2008; Wheeler & Miyake, 
1992), people are likely to be good at detecting and interpreting these cues. Thus, people 
likely interpret similarity and reciprocity as cues, in comparison to trustworthiness, due to 
the ease and fluency associated with their processing. 
7.1 Implications 
Trust is the cornerstone of all interpersonal relationships, which means that 
understanding the basis for trust formation provides insight to the basis of relationship 
formation. Thus, from this set of experiments, we have learned that both high levels of 
similarity and social reciprocity are crucial to the development of successful 
relationships. While the idea of similarity being important in relationships has been 
around for a while, the results have been inconsistent (Luo & Zhang, 2009; Youyou et al., 
2017). Reciprocity of liking has been stated to influence relationships but little work has 
been done to suggest that reciprocity of social cues plays an important role as well. This 
may be because the concept of fluidity of social interactions is rarely considered outside 
of clinical lore and a small body of literature describing social interaction from an 
ethnographic perspective. However, in normal functioning this reciprocity also matters. 
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Because it is so frequent (Oullier et al., 2008), people may come to expect its presence 
(Heerey, 2015; Heerey & Crossley, 2013). When reciprocity is disrupted or does not 
occur at expected rates, it may be perceived as offputting and indicate to the receiver that 
this interaction partner should be passed over in favour of more fruitful partners. To the 
extent that they are non-overlapping constructs, similarity may serve similar purposes. 
Nonetheless, this set of experiments provides high powered evidence to suggest that 
similarity and social reciprocity do indeed shape social outcomes. 
This work also speaks to the need to reconsider similarity as the main (or possibly 
only) predictor of trust behaviour, especially in the context of trust development in 
stranger interactions or in new relationships. Given that social reciprocity often has 
temporal precedence over similarity it is likely that reciprocity of social cues impacts 
impressions of trustworthiness before similaritiy and that these cues shape interpretations 
of similarity. This may mean that reciprocity is really the driving factor behind both of 
these effects.  
7.2 Limitations 
One obvious limitation of this set of experiments is that it describes “interactions” 
that were completely computer controlled. However, this is the only way to tightly 
control and manipulate social cues and information without the use of confederates, who 
are prone to their own sources of error including memory limitations and fluctuations in 
behaviour across experimental sessions and task conditions (e.g., Kuhlen & Brennan, 
2013). Nonetheless, even though these avatar interactions were not as realistic as true 
interactions, all the participants we included in our analyses genuinely believed they had 
interacted with other people. The fact that we observed such consistent results even in the 
minimal social context of the present research, suggests that these interactions are an 
excellent proxy for real face-to-face behaviour, which we simply do not have the ability 
to manipulate cleanly. Moreover, true manipulation of objective similarity and social 
reciprocity is the only way to determine the degree to which such variables are causally 
important in determining trust judgments. Here, we can confidently say that higher levels 
of objective similarity and social reciprocity caused increases in trust behaviour and that 
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these results demonstrate the importance of incorporating both variables in explorations 
of the underpinnings of trust-based decision-making. 
The second limitation of this set of experiments is that we used convenience samples 
of participants from Western’s undergraduate research pool. Although these students may 
not be representative of the general population in many respects (Peterson, 2001), in the 
context of online social behaviour, they are probably quite a good test sample as they are 
generally frequent social media users and therefore conduct a large proportion of their 
social lives online (Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr (2010). Given that this project is 
proof of concept work, a convenience sample of this type is justifiable.   
The final limitation of this work is that although the manipulation we used allows us 
to conclude that similarity and reciprocity are important and independent predictors of 
trust, it does not allow us to determine the relationship between them. We have argued 
that reciprocity may precede perceptions of similarity and trust or that it may act to 
enhance interaction “fluency,” such that people perceive similarity even when it is 
lacking in an objective sense. Our data do not, however, allow us to speak to the natural 
relationships between these variables, which will be important to disentangle in both 
experimental and observational contexts.  
7.3 Future Directions 
Given that our work has not been able to disentangle the effects of similarity and 
social reciprocity, an important future direction is to determine the relationship between 
perceptions of similarity and the presence of social reciprocity. The fact that our data 
showed that both reciprocity and objective similarity predicted perceived similarity, 
suggests that the relationship between these variables may be more complicated than 
previous research, our own included, has been able to examine. We have argued that 
reciprocity may precede perceptions of similarity by changing people’s experience of an 
interaction. However, to truly understand these effects, we must design an experimental 
manipulation that tests the foundations of these relationships.  
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Another important direction now that we have determined that social reciprocity 
independently contributes to trust decisions in an experimental context will be to 
determine whether these results are replicable in a naturalistic interaction. Specifically, it 
will be important to determine whether greater instances of unmanipulated social 
reciprocity in face-to-face interaction produce increases in trust behaviour. Indeed, there 
are a number of interesting negotiation games (e.g., van den Assem, van Dolder, & thaler, 
2010) that will allow us to examine the relationship between reciprocity and trust in face-
to-face contexts. If these effects exist in real-world interactions, then we can be sure that 
reciprocity really does play a crucial role in trust decisions. Otherwise, these effects lack 
ecological validity, which may be a critical weakness of the similarity and trust research. 
7.4 Conclusion  
Trust is an important aspect of all interpersonal relationships. These data demonstrate 
that people trust others more when they are highly objectively similar and engage in high 
levels of social reciprocity. Thus, both social reciprocity and similarity are likely to be 
important precursors to the feelings of trust that underpin relationship development. 
Given that successful interpersonal relationships are key to social life and well-being 
(Siedlecki, Salthouse, Oishi, & Jeswani, 2013; Valkenburg, Peter, & Schouten, 2006, 
understanding what leads to successful versus unsuccessful relationships is crucial. Here, 
we have reliably demonstrated that similarity and social reciprocity are two such 
variables that lead to trust and thereby contribute to interpersonal relationship 
development. 
47 
 
References 
Andersson, L.M., & Pearson, C.M. (1999). Tit for tat? The spiraling effect of incivility in 
the workplace. Academy of Management Review, 24, 452-471. doi: 
10.5465/AMR.1999.2202131 
Appiah, O., Knobloch-Westerwick, S., & Alter, S. (2013). Ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup derogation: Effects of news valence, character race, and recipient race 
on selective new reading. Journal of Communication, 63, 517-534. doi: 
10.1111/jcom.12032 
Axelrod, R. (1980). More effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 24, 379-403. doi: 10.1177/002200278002400301 
Bagues, M., & Perez-Villadoniga, M.J. (2013). Why do I like people like me? Journal of 
Economic Theory, 148, 1292-1299. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.014 
Balliet, D., & Wu, J., & DeDreu, C.K.W. (2014). Ingroup favoritism in cooperation: A 
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 140, 1556-1581. doi: 10.1037/a0037737 
Behrens, T.E.J., Hunt, L.T., & Rushmore, M.F.S. (2009). The computation of social 
behaviour. Science, 324, 1160-1164. Doi: 10.1126/science.1169694 
Behrens, T.E.J., Hunt, L.T., Woolrich, M.W., & Rushworth, M.F.S. (2008). Associative 
learning of social value. Nature, 456, 245-249. doi: 10.1038/nature07538 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games 
and Economic Behaviour, 10, 122-142. doi: 10.1006/game.1995.1027 
Bernieri, F., Davis, J., Rosenthal, R., & Knee, C. (1994). Interactional synchrony and 
rapport: Measuring synchrony in displays devoid of sound and facial affect. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 303-311. doi: 
10.1177/0146167294203008 
Brülhart, M., & Usunier, J-C. (2012). Does the trust game measure trust? Economic 
Letters, 115, 20-23. 
Burnham, T., McCabe, K., & Smith, V.L. (2000). Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in 
an extensive form trust game. Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 
43, 57-73. doi: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00108-6 
Byrne, D.G. (1971). The attraction paradigm. New York: Academic Press. 
Campbell, L., Chin, K., & Stanton, S.C.E. (2016). Initial evidence that individuals for 
new relationships with partners that more closely match their ideal preferences. 
Collbra, 2(1), 2. doi: 10.1525/Collabra.24 
Chartrand, T.L., & Bargh, J.A. (1999). The chameleon effect: The perception-behaviour 
link and social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 
893-910. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.76.6.893 
48 
 
Chartrand, T.L., & Lakin, J.L. (2013). The antecedents and consequences of human 
behavioural mimicry. Annual Review of Psychology, 64, 285-308. doi: 
10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143754 
Chen, F.F., & Kenrick, D.T. (2002). Repulsion or attraction? Group membership and 
assumed attitude similarity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 
111-125. doi: 10.1037///0022-3514.83.1.111 
Chung, D., Christopoulos, G.I., King-Casas, B., Ball, S.B., & Chiu, P.H. (2015). Social 
signals of safety and risk confer utility and have asymmetric effects on observers’ 
choices. Nature Neuroscience, 18, 912-916. doi: 10.1038/nn.4022 
Cialdini, R.B., & Goldstein, N.J. (2004). Social influence: Compliance and conformity. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 591-621, doi: 
10.2246/annurev.psych.55.090902.142015 
Costa-Gomes, M.A., Huck, S., Weizsäcker, G. (2014). Beliefs and actions in the trust 
game: Creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect. Games and 
Economic Behaviour, 88, 298-309. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.006 
DeBruine, L.M. (2002). Facial resemblance enhances trust. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 269, 1307-1312. 
doi:10.1098/rpsb.2002.2034 
DeBruine, L.M. (2005). Trustworthy but not lust-worthy: Context-specific effects of 
facial resemblance. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological 
Sciences, 272, 919-922. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2004.3003 
Delaherche, E., Chetouani, M., Mahdhaoui, A., Saint-Georges, C., Viaux, S., & Cohen, 
D. (2012). Interpersonal synchrony: A survey of evaluation methods across 
disciplines. IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing, 3, 349-365. doi: 
10.1109/T-AFFC.2012.12 
Diehl, M. (1990). The minimal group paradigm: Theoretical explanations and empirical 
findings. European Review of Social Psychology, 1, 263-292. doi: 
10.1080/14792779108401864 
Duersch, P., Oeschssler, J., & Schipper, B.C. (2014). When is tit-for-tat unbeatable? 
International Journal of Game Theory, 43, 25-36. doi: 10.1007/s00182-013-0370-
1 
Duffy, K.A., & Chartrand, T.L. (2015). Mimicry: causes and consequences. Current 
Opinion in Behavioural Sciences, 3, 112-116. doi: 10.1016/j.cobehav.2015.03.002 
E-Prime (Version 2) [Computer Software]. Pittsburgh, PA: Psychology Software Tools, 
Inc. 
Farmer, H., McKay, R., Tsakiris, M. (2014). Trust in me: Trustworthy others are seen as 
more physically similar to the self. Psychological Science, 25, 290-292, doi: 
10.1177/0956797613494852 
Fischer, I. (2009). Friend or foe: Subjective expected relative similarity as a determinant 
of cooperation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138, 341-350.doi: 
10.1037/a0016073 
49 
 
Fischer, I., Frid, A., Goerg, S.J., Levin, S.A., Rubenstein, D.I., & Selten, R. (2013). 
Fusing enacted and expected mimicry generates a winning strategy that promotes 
the evolution of cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States of America, 110, 10229-10233. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1308221110 
Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic decision making. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 62, 451-482. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346 
Glaeser, E.L., Laibson, D.I., Scheinkman, J.A., & Soutter, C.L. (2000). Measuring trust. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 811-846. doi: 
10.1162/003355300554926 
Glimcher, P.W., & Rustichini, A. (2004). Neuroeconomics: The consilience of brain and 
decision. Science, 306, 447-452. doi: 10.1126/science.1102566 
Goette, L., Huffman, D., & Meier, S. (2006). The impact of group membership on 
cooperation and norm enforcement: Evidence using random assignment to real 
social groups. Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, No. 06-7. 
Retrieved from https://www.econstor.eu 
Gordon, R.M. (1992). The simulation theory: Objections and misconceptions. Mind and 
Language, 7, 11-34. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00295.x 
Gosling, S.D., Rentfrow, P.J., & Swann, W.B., Jr. (2003). A very brief measure of the 
big-five personality domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37, 504-528. 
doi: 10.1016/S0092-6566(033)00046-1 
Greenwald, A.G., & Pettigrew, T.F. (2014). With malice toward none and charity for 
some: Ingroup favoritisms enables discrimination. American Psychologist, 69, 
669-684. doi: 10.1037/a0036056 
Griffin, A.S., & West, S.A. (2003). Kin discrimination and the benefits of helping in 
cooperatively breeding vertebrates. Science, 302, 634-636. doi: 
10.1126/science.1089402 
Heerey, E.A. (2015). Decoding the dyad: Challenges in the study of individual 
differences in social behaviour. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24, 
285-291. doi: 10.1177/0963721415570731 
Heerey, E.A., & Clerke, A. (2017). The influence of similarity and social reciprocity on 
decisions to trust. Retrieved from osf.io/dv7np 
Heerey, E.A., & Crossley, H.M. (2013). Predictive and reactive mechanisms in smile 
reciprocity. Psychological Science, 24, 1446-1455, doi: 
10.1177/0956797612472203 
Heerey, E.A., & Kring, A.M. (2007). Interpersonal consequences of social anxiety. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 116, 125-134. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.116.125 
Jenkins, A.C., Macrae, C.N., & Mitchell, J.P. (2008). Repetition suppression of 
ventromedial prefrontal activity during judgement of self and others. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 4507-
4512. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0708785105 
50 
 
Kanazawa, S., & Fontaine, L. (2013). Intelligent people defect more in a one-shot 
prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 
6, 201-213. doi: 10.1037/npe0000010 
Kandasamy, N., Hardy, B., Page, L., Schaffner, M., Graggaber, J., Powlson, A.S. … & 
Coates, J. (2014). Cortisol shifts financial risk preferences. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 111, 3608-3613. 
doi: 10.1037/pnas.1317908111 
King-Casas, B., Tomlin, D., Anen, C., Quartz, S.R., & Montague, P.R. (2005). Getting to 
know you: Reputation and trust in a two-person economic exchange. Science, 
308, 78-83. doi: 10.1126/science.1108062 
Kirschner, S., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Joint music-making promotes prosocial 
behaviour in 4-year old children. Evolution and Human Behaviour, 31, 354-364. 
doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.04.004 
Krueger, J. (1998). Enhancement bias in descriptions of self and others. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 505-516. doi: 10.1177/0146167298245006 
Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P.J., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. Oxytocin increases 
trust in humans. Nature, 435, 673-676. doi: 10.1038/nature03701 
Krupp, D.B., Debruine, L.M., & Barclay, P. (2008). A cue of kinship promotes 
cooperation for the public good. Evolution and Human Behaviour, 29, 49-55. doi: 
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.08.002 
Kuhlen, A.K., & Brennan, S.E. (2013). Language in dialogue: When confederates might 
be hazardous to your data. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20, 54-72. doi: 
10.3758/s13423-012-0341-8 
Kutas, M., & Federmeirer, K.D. (2011). Thirty years and counting: Fidning meaning in 
the N400 componenet of the even-related brain potential (ERP). Anuual Review of 
Psychology, 62, 621-647. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.131123 
Kutas, M., & Hillyard, S.A. (1980). Reading senseless sentences: Brain potentials reflect 
semantic incongruity. Science, 207, 203-205.  
Lakin, J.L., & Chartrand, T.L. (2003). Using nonconscious behavioural mimicry to create 
affiliation and rapport. Psychological Science, 14, 334-339. doi: 10.1111/1467-
9280.14481 
Lakin, J.L., Chartrand, T.L., & Arkin, R.M. (2008). I am too just like you: Nonconscious 
mimicry as an automatic behavioural response to social exclusion. Psychological 
Science, 19, 816-822. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02162x 
Launay, J., Dean, R.T., & Bailes, F. (2013). Synchronization can influence trust 
following virtual interaction. Experimental Psychology, 60, 56-63. doi: 
10.1027/1618-3169/a000173 
Lenhart, A., Purcell, K., Smith, A., & Zickuhr, K. (2010). Social media and young adults. 
Pew Internet & American Life Project, 3. Retrieved from pewinternet.org 
51 
 
Lieberman, D., Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2007). The architecture of human kin 
detection. Nature, 445, 727-731. doi: 10.1038/nature05510 
Lui, S.S., Ngo, H., Hon, A.H.Y. (2006). Coercive strategy in interfirm cooperation: 
Mediating roles of interpersonal and interorganizational trust. Journal of Business 
Research, 59, 466-474. doi: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2005.09.001 
Luo, S., & Zhang, Guangjian. (2009). What leads to romantic attraction: Similarity, 
reciprocity, security, or beauty? Evidence from a speed-dating study. Journal of 
Personality, 77, 933-964. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2009.00570.x 
MacDonald, K., Schug, M., Chase, E., & Barth, E. (2013). My people, right or wrong? 
Minimal group membership disrupts preschoolers’ selective trust. Cognitive 
Development, 28, 247-259. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2012.11.001 
Maddux, W.W., Mullen, W., & Galinsky, A.D. (2008). Chameleons bake bigger pies and 
take bigger pieces: Strategic behavioural mimicry facilitates negotiation 
outcomes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 461-468. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.02.003 
Mailath, G.J. (1998). Do people play nash equilibrium? Lessons from evolutionary game 
theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 1347-1374.  
Malhotra, D. (2004). Trust and reciprocity decisions: The differing perspectives of 
trustors and trusted parties. Organizational Behaviour and Human Decisions 
Processes, 94¸61-73. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2004.03.001 
Mayer, R.C., Davis, J.H., & Schoorman, F.D. (1995). An integrative model of 
organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20, 709-734. 
doi:10.5465/AMR.1995.9508080335 
McKelvey, R.D., & Palfrey, T.R. (1992). An experimental study of the centipede game. 
Econometrica, 60, 803-836. doi: 10.2307/2951567 
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J.M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in 
social networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 415-444. doi: 
10.1146/annurev.soc.27.415 
Metzger, M.J., & Flanagin, A.J. (2013). Credibility and trust of information in online 
environments: The use of cognitive heuristics. Journal of Pragmatics, 59, 210-
220. doi: 10.1016/j.pragma.2013.07.012 
Montoya, R.M., & Horton, R.S. (2012). The reciprocity of liking effect. In Paludi, M. 
(Ed.). The Psychology of Love (pp.39-57). Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger 
Montoya, R.M., & Pittinsky, T.L. (2011). When increased group identification leads to 
outgroup liking and cooperation: The role of trust. The Journal of Social 
Psychology, 151, 784-806. doi: 10.1080/00224545.2010.538762 
Newcomb, T.M. (1956). The prediction of interpersonal attraction. American Psychology, 
11, 575-586. doi: 10.1037/00003-066X.44.5.775 
52 
 
O’Leary, D.P. (1990). Robust regression computation using iteratively reweighted least 
squares. SIAM Journal on Matrix Analysis and Applications, 11, 466-480. doi: 
10.1137/0611032 
Ong, D., Zaki, J., & Gruber, J. (2017). Increased cooperative behaviour across remitted 
bipolar I disorders and major depression: Insights utilizing a behavioural 
economic trust game. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 126, 1-7. doi: 
10.1037/abn0000239 
Oullier, O., de Guzman, G.C., Jantzen, K.J., Lagarde, J., & Kelso, J.A.S. (2008). Social 
coordination dynamics: Measuring human bonding. Social Neuroscience, 3, 178-
192. doi: 10.1080/17470910701563392 
Park, J.H., & Schaller, M. (2005). Does attitude similarity serve as a heuristic cue for 
kinship? Evidence of an implicit cognitive association. Evolution and Human 
Behaviour, 26, 158-170. doi: 10.1016j.evolhumbehav.2004.08.013 
Peterson, R.A. (2001). On the use of college students in social science research: Insights 
from a second-order meta-analysis. Journal of Consumer Research, 28, 450-461. 
doi: 10.1086/323732 
Pillutla, M.M., Malhotra, D., & Keith, M.J. (2003). Attributions of trust and the calculus 
of reciprocity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 448-455. doi: 
10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00015-5 
R Core Team (2017). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL http://www.R-
project.org/. 
Rosenthal, R.W. (1981). Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-
store paradox. Journal of Economic Theory, 25, 92-100. doi: 10.1016/0022-
0531(81)990018-1 
Rotter, J.B. (1967). A new scale for the measurement of interpersonal trust. Journal of 
Personality, 35, 651-665. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1967.tb0145.x 
Rushton, J.P., & Bons, T.A. (2005). Mate choice and friendship in twins: Evidence for 
genetic similarity. Psychological Science, 16, 555-559. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-
7976.2005.01574.x 
Sanders, M., Winters, P., & Fiscella, K. (2015). Preliminary validation of a scale to 
measure patient perceived similarity to their navigator.  BioMed Central Research 
Notes, 8: 388. doi: 10.1186/s13104-015-1341-3Schilbach, L., Wohlschalaeger, 
A.M., Kraemer, N.C., Newen, A., Shah, N.J., Fink, G.R., & Vogeley, K. (2006). 
Being with virtual others: Neural correlated of social interaction. 
Neuropsychologia, 44, 718-730. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.07.017 
Seibt, B., Mühlberger, A., Liowski, K.U., & Weyers, P. (2015). Facial mimicry in its 
social setting. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1122. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01122  
Shore, D.M., & Heerey, E.A. (2011). The value of genuine and polite smiles. Emotion, 
11, 169-174. doi: 10.1037/a0022601 
53 
 
Shore, D.M., & Heerey, E.A. (2013). Do social utility judgements influence attentional 
processing? Cognition, 129, 114-122. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.06.011 
Siedlecki, K.L., Salthouse, T.A., Oishi, S., & Jeswani, S. (2014). The relationship 
between social support and subjective well-being across age. Social Indicators 
Research, 117, 561-576. doi: 10.1007/s11205-013-0361-4 
Simons, J. Attitude Similarity and Attraction: Trust as a Robust Mediator (Master’s 
thesis). Retrieved from scholarbank.nus.edu.sg  
Sparks, A., Burleigh, T., Barclay, P. (2015). We can see inside: Accurate prediction of 
prisoner’s dilemma decisions in announced games following a face-to-face 
interaction. Evolution and Human Behaviour, 37, 210-216. doi: 
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.11.003 
Stel, M., & Vonk, R. (2010). Mimicry in social interaction: Benefits for mimickers, 
mimickees, and their interaction. British Journal of Psychology, 101, 311-323. 
doi: 10.1348/000712609X465424 
Taylor, S.E., & Brown, J.D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological 
perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210. doi: 
10.1037/0033-2909.103.2.193 
Tidwell, N.D., Eastwick, P.W., & Finkel, E.J. (2013). Perceived, not actual, similarity 
predicts initial attraction in a live romantic context: Evidence from the speed-
dating paradigm. Personal Relationships, 20, 199-215. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-
6811.2012.01405.x 
Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2011). Synchrony and the social tuning of compassion. 
Emotion, 11, 262-266. doi: 10.1037/a0021302 
Valkenburg, P.M., Peter, J., & Schouten, A.P. (2006). Friend networking sites and their 
relationship to adolescents’ well-being and social self-esteem. Cyberpscyhology 
and Behaviour, 9, 584-590. doi: 10.1089/cpb.2006.9.584 
van den Assem, M.J., van Dolder, D., & Thaler, R.H. (2011). Split or steal? Cooperative 
behaviour when the stakes are large. Management Science, 58, 2-20. doi: 
10.1287/mnsc.1110.1413 
Vang, M.H., & Fox, J. (2013). Race in virtual environments: Competitive versus 
cooperative games with black or white avatars. Cyberpsychology, Behaviour, and 
Social Networking, 17, 235-240. doi: 10.1089/cyber.2013.0289 
Viechtbauer, W. (2010). Conducting meta-analyses in R with the metaphor package. 
Journal of Statistical Software, 36, 1-48. 
Von Neumann, J., & Morganstern, O. Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947 
Wheeler, L., & Miyake, K. (1992). Social comparison in everyday life. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psycology, 62, 760-773. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.62.760 
Whitmore, C.B., & Dunsmore, J.C. (2014). Trust development: Testing a new model in 
undergraduate roommate relationships. The Journal of Genetic Psychology: 
54 
 
Research and Theory on Human Development, 175, 233-251. doi: 
10.1080/00221325.2013.869533 
Whittlesea, B.W.A., & Leboe, J.P. (2000). The heuristic basis of remembering and 
classification: Fluency, generation, and resemblance. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 129, 84-106. doi: 10.1037//0096-3445.129.1.84 
Williams, M. (2001). In whom we trust: Group membership as an affective context for 
trust development. Academy of Management Review, 26, 377-396. doi: 
10.5465/AMR.2001.4845794 
Wilson, K.S., DeRue, D.S., Matta, F.K., Howe, M., & Conlon, D.E. (2016). Personality 
similarity in negotiations: Testing the dyadic effects of similarity in interpersonal 
traits and the use of emotional displays on negotiation outcomes. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 101, 1405-1421. doi: 10.1037/ap10000132 
Wiltermuth, S.S., & Heath, C. (2009). Synchrony and cooperation. Psychological 
Science, 20, 1-5. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02253.x 
Wood, J.V. (1996). What is social comparison and how should we study it? Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 520-537. doi: 10.1177/014616729225009 
Wuensch, K.L. (2016). Using SPSS to Obtain a Confidence Interval of R2 from 
Regression. Retrieved from http://core.ecu.edu/psyc/wuenschk/SPSS/SPSS-
Programs.htm 
Yan, W-J., Wu, Q., Liang, J., Chen, Y-H., & Fu, X. (2013). How fast are the leaked facial 
expression: The duration of micro-expression. Journal of Nonverbal Behaviour, 
37, 217-230. doi: 10.1007/s10919-013-0159-8 
Youyou, W., Stillwell, D., Schwartz, H.A., Kosinski, M. (2017). Birds of a feather do 
flock together: Behaviour-based personality-assessment method reveals 
personality similarity among couples and friends. Psychological Science, 28, 276-
284. doi: 10.1177/0956797616678187 
Ziegler, C-N. & Golbeck, J. (2007). Investigating interactions of trust and interest 
similarity.  Decision Support Systems, 43, 460-475. doi: 
10.1016/j.dss.2006.11.003 
 
 
55 
 
Appendices  
Appendix A: Letters of Information 
Experiment 1 & 2: 
Project Title: Social cues in a chat-room environment 
 
Document Title: Letter of information 
 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Erin Heerey, PhD (eheerey@uwo.ca) 
 
Invitation to Participate: You are being invited to participate in a research study investigating 
how social cues in an online environment shape people’s later behaviour. You are being invited to 
participate because you signed up for the study on SONA.  
 
Why is this study being done? The purpose of this study is to understand how nonverbal social 
cues affect the outcomes of social interactions. 
 
How long will you be in this study? Participation takes about 1 hour and the session will take 
place in the social psychology research rooms (6400 Block SSC).  
 
What are the study procedures? If you decide to participate, we will ask you to: 
 Get to know several other players over a computer network, using an instant message 
style program.  
 Complete a short game with each of them and rate them on several characteristics.  
 Answer some questionnaires that ask about aspects of your own personality. 
 
What are the risks and harms of participating in this study? This is a low-risk study and there 
are no known harms to participating. The main risk to you is that you may feel uncomfortable 
answering some of the questions on the questionnaires. If this occurs, you may skip those items.  
 
What are the benefits of participating in this study? Other than that you might find it 
interesting, there is no direct benefit to you for participating in this study. However, your 
participation might help us to understand how the social cues one person provides predict and 
influence others’ behaviour.  
 
How will participants’ information be kept confidential? All information that we obtain from 
you is confidential. Questionnaire information and task results will be collected using a unique 
participant code (below), which will never be linked to your name. These data will be collected 
electronically and stored in password-protected, encrypted files for 5 years, per Western 
University guidelines. While we do our best to protect your information, there is no guarantee 
that we will be able to do so.  
Usually it is only the research staff that will have access to the data. However, 
representatives of The University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board may 
require access to your study-related records to monitor the conduct of the research. If study 
results are published, no information that identifies you will be included.  
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Can participants choose to leave the study? Participation in this study is voluntary. You are 
free to withdraw from the study at any time and without penalty, even after the research has 
concluded. You do not need to provide a reason. You may withdraw from the study by telling the 
experimenter or by contacting Dr. Erin Heerey (eheerey@uwo.ca) and submitting your 
participant code as it appears below. All data associated with your code will then be destroyed. 
 
Are participants compensated for their time? This is a 1-hour study. If you are a Psychology 
1000 student, you will receive 1.0 SONA credits for participating. If you are participating in the 
context of a different class, you will receive compensation based on the information provided in 
the course syllabus. If you have any questions about the compensation, please review your course 
syllabus or contact the instructor.  
 Although it is not an aspect of the compensation per se, the game you will play after you 
get to know the other players asks participants make decisions that affect how a pool of money is 
shared. We will pay participants a small monetary bonus based on their decisions in the game. 
Participants will earn between $3 and $7 depending on the outcome of their decisions.  
 
What are the rights of participants? Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may 
decide not to be involved. Even if you consent to participate, you have the right to not answer 
individual questions or to withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose not to participate or 
choose to leave the study, it will have no effect on your academic standing. If new information is 
learned during the study that might affect your decision to stay in the study we will inform you of 
this. You do not waive any legal right by consenting to the study. 
 
Whom do participants contact for questions? If you would like more information, please 
contact Dr. Erin Heerey via email (eheerey@uwo.ca) or phone (519) 661-2111 x 86917. 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or concerns about the 
conduct of this study, you may contact The Office of Research Ethics (519) 661-3036, email: 
ethics@uwo.ca.  
 
If you decide to participate, your participant code is: ________________________________ 
 
When the computer program starts, you will be asked to affirm (say “yes” to) the following 
items: 
 
 I have read and understood the Letter of Information.  
 Any questions I chose to ask have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time and do not need to provide a 
reason for doing so.  
 I understand that I am free to skip any questionnaire items that I do not wish to answer.  
 I consent to participate. 
 
Affirming these items indicates that you consent to participate. 
 
Please keep this letter for future reference.  
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Experiment 3: 
 
Project Title: Social cues in a chat-room environment 2 
 
Document Title: Letter of information 
 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Erin Heerey, PhD (eheerey@uwo.ca) 
 
Invitation to Participate: You are being invited to participate in a research study investigating 
how social cues in an online environment shape people’s later behaviour. You are being invited to 
participate because you signed up for the study on SONA.  
 
Why is this study being done? The purpose of this study is to understand how nonverbal social 
cues affect the outcomes of social interactions. 
 
How long will you be in this study? Participation takes about 1 hour and the session will take 
place in the social psychology research rooms (6400 Block SSC).  
 
What are the study procedures? If you decide to participate, we will ask you to: 
 Get to know several other players over a computer network, using an instant message 
style program.  
 Complete a short game with each of them and rate them on several characteristics.  
 Answer some questionnaires that ask about aspects of your own personality. 
 
What are the risks and harms of participating in this study? This is a low-risk study and there 
are no known harms to participating. The main risk to you is that you may feel uncomfortable 
answering some of the questions on the questionnaires. If this occurs, you may skip those items.  
 
What are the benefits of participating in this study? Other than that you might find it 
interesting, there is no direct benefit to you for participating in this study. However, your 
participation might help us to understand how the social cues one person provides predict and 
influence others’ behaviour.  
 
How will participants’ information be kept confidential? All information that we obtain from 
you is confidential. Questionnaire information and task results will be collected using a unique 
participant code (below), which will never be linked to your name. These data will be collected 
electronically and stored in password-protected, encrypted files for 5 years, per Western 
University guidelines. While we do our best to protect your information, there is no guarantee 
that we will be able to do so.  
Usually it is only the research staff that will have access to the data. However, 
representatives of The University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board may 
require access to your study-related records to monitor the conduct of the research. If study 
results are published, no information that identifies you will be included.  
 
Can participants choose to leave the study? Participation in this study is voluntary. You are 
free to withdraw from the study at any time and without penalty, even after the research has 
concluded. You do not need to provide a reason. You may withdraw from the study by telling the 
experimenter or by contacting Dr. Erin Heerey (eheerey@uwo.ca) and submitting your 
participant code as it appears below. All data associated with your code will then be destroyed. 
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Are participants compensated for their time? This is a 1-hour study. If you are a Psychology 
1000 student, you will receive 1.0 SONA credits for participating. If you are participating in the 
context of a different class, you will receive compensation based on the information provided in 
the course syllabus. If you have any questions about the compensation, please review your course 
syllabus or contact the instructor.  
What are the rights of participants? Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may 
decide not to be involved. Even if you consent to participate, you have the right to not answer 
individual questions or to withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose not to participate or 
choose to leave the study, it will have no effect on your academic standing. If new information is 
learned during the study that might affect your decision to stay in the study we will inform you of 
this. You do not waive any legal right by consenting to the study. 
 
Whom do participants contact for questions? If you would like more information, please 
contact Dr. Erin Heerey via email (eheerey@uwo.ca) or phone (519) 661-2111 x 86917. 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or concerns about the 
conduct of this study, you may contact The Office of Research Ethics (519) 661-3036, email: 
ethics@uwo.ca.  
 
If you decide to participate, your participant code is: ________________________________ 
 
When the computer program starts, you will be asked to affirm (say “yes” to) the following 
items: 
 
 I have read and understood the Letter of Information.  
 Any questions I chose to ask have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time and do not need to provide a 
reason for doing so.  
 I understand that I am free to skip any questionnaire items that I do not wish to answer.  
 If I consent to participate, I promise that I will participate conscientiously and to the best 
of my ability.  
 I consent to participate. 
 
Affirming these items indicates that you consent to participate. 
 
Please keep this letter for future reference.  
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Appendix B: Consent Procedure. 
Studies 1 & 2a: 
When the computer program starts, you will be asked to affirm (say “yes” to) the 
following items: 
 
 I have read and understood the Letter of Information.  
 Any questions I chose to ask have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time and do not need to 
provide a reason for doing so.  
 I understand that I am free to skip any questionnaire items that I do not wish to 
answer.  
 I consent to participate. 
 
Affirming these items indicates that you consent to participate. 
Studies 2b & 3: 
When the computer program starts, you will be asked to affirm (say “yes” to) the 
following items: 
 
 I have read and understood the Letter of Information.  
 Any questions I chose to ask have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time and do not need to 
provide a reason for doing so.  
 I understand that I am free to skip any questionnaire items that I do not wish to 
answer.  
 If I consent to participate, I promise that I will participate conscientiously and to 
the best of my ability.  
 I consent to participate. 
 
Affirming these items indicates that you consent to participate. 
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Appendix C: Getting Acquainted Questions. 
1) Which type of book would you be most likely to choose for pleasure reading? 
a) Literature 
b) Romance 
c) Mystery/Crime 
d) Fantasy 
 
2) Which colour do you prefer? 
a) Green 
b) Blue 
c) Purple 
d) Red 
 
3) Which leisure activity do you prefer? 
a) Watch TV/Movies 
b) Read a book 
c) Workout 
d) Hang out with friends  
 
4) Which cuisine do you prefer? 
a) Chinese 
b) Mexican 
c) Japanese 
d) Italian 
 
5) What is your favourite sport? 
a) Hockey 
b) Basketball 
c) Football 
d) Tennis 
 
6) Are you more of morning or an evening person? 
a) Morning 
b) Evening 
 
7) Are you originally from Canada? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
8) Do you live off campus or on campus? 
a) On 
b) Off 
 
9) Do you like to cook? 
a) Yes 
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b) No 
 
10) What continent would you most like to visit? 
a) Europe 
b) Australia 
c) Africa 
d) Asia 
 
11)  Do you prefer to go out and party or to relax at home? 
a) Relax at home 
b) Go out and party 
 
12) What is your favourite season? 
a) Winter 
b) Spring 
c) Summer 
d) Fall 
 
13) Would you rather read a book or watch a TV show? 
a) Read a book 
b) Watch a TV show 
 
14) Do you prefer Macs or PCs? 
a) Macs 
b) PCs 
 
15) What is your preferred social media site? 
a) Facebook 
b) Twitter 
c) YouTube 
d) Instagram 
 
16) Would you most prefer a city vacation or a country vacation? 
a) City 
b) Country 
 
17) Would you consider yourself a feminist? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
18) What would you most like to be someday? 
a) Doctor 
b) Lawyer 
c) Engineer 
d) Entrepreneur 
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19) Would you tend to see yourself as more liberal or more conservative? 
a) Liberal 
b) Conservative 
 
20) Do you have a religious affiliation? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
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Appendix D: Questionnaires 
Ten-Item Personality Inventory: 
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). A Very Brief Measure of the 
Big Five Personality Domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37, 504-528. 
For avatar- ratings:  Here are a number of personality that may or may not apply to the 
people you met. Please use the number keys to indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with each trait. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to 
the person in the image below, even if you think one of the traits might apply more 
strongly than the other. You may use the “9” key to skip an item.  
1= 
Disagree 
strongly 
2= 
Disagree 
moderately 
3= 
Disagree a 
little 
4= Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
5= Agree 
a little 
6= Agree 
moderately 
7= Agree 
strongly 
1) Extraverted, enthusiastic. 
2) Critical, quarrelsome. 
3) Dependable, self-disciplined. 
4) Anxious, easily upset. 
5) Open to new experiences, complex. 
6) Reserved, quiet. 
7) Sympathetic, warm. 
8) Disorganized, careless. 
9) Calm, emotionally stable. 
10) Conventional, uncreative. 
 
Additional items: 
Experiments 1, 2, & 3: 
11) Similar to me. 
 
Experiments 2 & 3: 
12) In sync with me. 
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Appendix E: Trust Decision Task 
1) Lend your car keys to 
2) Believe lied to you about something 
3) Ask for a character reference for a job from 
4) Give your computer password to 
5) Do a group project with 
6) Believe intentionally gave you bad advice for an assignment 
7) Let watch your pet while you are away 
8) Give a spare house key to 
9) Choose for a housemate 
10) Lend $20 to 
11) Let hand in an assignment on your behalf 
12) Get class selection advice from 
13) Ask to be your designated driver 
14) Ask to take notes for you if you cannot make it to class. 
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